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II.-82 
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ERA AND 
SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR ON THE 
UNITARY BUSINESS RULE 
Abstract: On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair 
eliminated the sales tax physical presence rule for the Dormant Commerce 
Clause’s “substantial nexus” requirement. This decision extends a State’s ability 
to tax interstate commerce. This Comment argues that Wayfair’s expansion of 
state tax jurisdiction should be applicable all forms of state taxation, as opposed 
to solely sales tax because it interprets the substantial nexus requirement of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. Corporate taxation’s unitary business rule should 
utilize the changes to the substantial nexus requirement to restore its original in-
tention and adapt to modern technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
States impose taxes to fund protections and benefits for the individuals 
and corporations within their borders.1 States use several forms of taxes, such 
as income tax, corporate income tax, sales and use tax, property tax, estate tax, 
and sin tax.2 These taxes are often viewed separately under the constitutional 
restraints of the Due Process Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause, leading 
to confusion and contradiction.3 The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair expanded the Dormant Commerce Clause’s “substantial 
nexus” jurisdiction for requiring businesses to collect sales tax.4 The Court 
reasoned that the prior physical presence rule was overly rigid, and innovations 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET & PUB. PRIORITIES 
(July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/policy-basics-where-do-our-
state-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/9XHB-AYA2] (providing examples of how the states spend tax 
revenue). Taxes are essentially payments we provide to be a part of a governed country. See Compania 
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J. 
dissenting) (arguing that taxes fund civilized society). 
 2 See State and Local Taxes, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 5, 2010), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Taxes/Pages/state-local.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2K9-JB49] (listing 
the types of state and local taxes); Franklin Liu, Note, Sin Taxes: Have Governments Gone Too Far in 
Their Efforts to Monetize Morality, 59 B.C. L. REV. 763, 764 (2018) (describing the sin tax as a meth-
od to discourage certain behavior). 
 3 See Why Large Corporations Can Do Business in Your Business Tax Free, INST. ON TAX’N & 
ECON. POL’Y (Dec. 2006) (highlighting that all state taxation is subject to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause limitation). Notwithstanding, sales tax and corporate income tax have different analyses for 
substantial nexus. Id. 
 4 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018). 
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in modern technology have distorted traditional notions of jurisdiction.5 This 
Comment argues that the changing substantial nexus standard for sales taxes 
should apply to other areas of state taxation because the Constitution limits 
states’ power to tax equally to all tax forms, and the Internet has changed soci-
ety such that institutional rules require reevaluation.6 One rule prime for 
reevaluation is the unitary business rule, which determines substantial nexus 
for an out-of-state parent corporation’s sale of an interest in an in-state subsidi-
ary.7 The unitary business rule is outdated and requires modification in light of 
Wayfair.8 Part I of this Comment details the history of the Due Process Clause 
and Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state taxation, emphasizing sales 
and corporate taxation.9 Part II of this Comment discusses the two major themes 
of the Wayfair decision: substantial purposeful availment and modern technolo-
gy.10 Part III of this Comment argues for modification of the unitary business 
rule based on changes in technology and substantial nexus from Wayfair.11 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON STATE TAXATION 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate com-
merce, implicitly limiting states’ power to do so in what is known as the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.12 In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady, the Supreme Court formalized the determination of whether statutes 
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.13 A state tax statute is constitutional 
when it “is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state.”14 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See id. at 2092 (overruling the physical presence rule because it is not required by the Constitu-
tion); Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (establishing the physical 
presence rule). 
 6 See infra notes 107–134 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (“Allied-Signal N.J.”), 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) 
(holding that the unitary business rule appropriately determines the extent of the Due Process Clause 
and Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state taxation). 
 8 See infra notes 113–125 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–72 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 73–106 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 107–136 and accompanying text. 
 12 U.S CONST. art I, § 8; see Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) 
(holding that this negative limitation applies to statutes that cover areas Congress has not specifically 
legislated). After the American Revolution, most states passed multiple tariffs taxing out of state 
goods. See M.E. Kelley, Tariff Acts Under the Constitution, 2 Q. J. ECON. 473, 473 (1888). This re-
striction on state power protects against the division created by the state tariffs during the Articles of 
Confederation. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979); see Comptroller of the Treasury 
v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015) (stating that a central problem of the Articles of Confedera-
tion was the burden imposed on interstate commerce by state taxation). 
 13 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). This test was a departure from 
prior cases that analyzed statutes on draftsmanship, rather than substance. See Ry. Express Agency v. 
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (upholding a franchise tax on the receipts from express companies for 
deliveries inside, outside, or through the state). But see Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 
(1954) (holding that a state cannot tax the privilege of passing through the state while conducting 
II.-84 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
The Due Process Clause requires that the tax seeks payment for “protec-
tion, opportunities[,] and benefits” derived from the state government.15 In 
1944, in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, the 
Supreme Court held that an in-state corporation’s dividend payments to non-
residents can be taxed because the activities producing the dividends received 
government benefits and protections.16 In 1991, in Allied-Signal Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Finance (“Allied-Signal N.Y.”), the New York Court of Appeals 
applied International Harvester to affirm New York’s tax on the sale of an in-
state corporation by an out-of-state corporation because of the similarity be-
tween capital gains and the dividends received by nonresident shareholders.17 
The sole consideration for constitutionality in these cases was whether the state 
provided benefits for which it deserved compensation, which always exist 
when an in-state corporation generates income.18 
Section A of this Part explores the relationship between substantial nexus 
and the Due Process Clause.19 Section B of this Part provides an overview of 
the sales tax law prior to Wayfair.20 Section C of this Part summarizes the Way-
                                                                                                                           
interstate commerce). Instead, in 1977, the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v Brady 
returned to a set of case law that focuses on taxing interstate commerce in a manner proportionate 
with the taxpayer’s in-state activity. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279; see W. Live Stock v. 
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1938) (stating that the Commerce Clause did not intend to 
protect interstate commerce from paying fairly apportioned taxes). See generally Pullman’s Palace 
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (holding that a state can impose a tax upon interstate 
activity in the same manner as it taxes intrastate activity). 
 14 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. A substantial nexus relates to the state’s taxing juris-
diction, and requires a connection between the state and the activity subject to taxation. Allied-Signal 
N.J., 504 U.S. at 772 (citing Mobil Oil Corp v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436–37 
(1980)). The other three requirements of the Dormant Commerce Clause are that the statute is “fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services 
provided by the taxing state.” Id. 
 15 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). This requirement is ultimately about 
fairness, based on “notice or fair warning.” Julie Roman Lackner, Note, The Evolution and Future of 
Substantial Nexus in State Taxation of Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1387, 1394 (2007). 
 16 Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 442 (1944). The state could tax the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the government services, regardless of where they resided. Id. at 441. 
 17 Allied-Signal Inc. v. Comm’r of Fin. (“Allied-Signal N.Y.”), 588 N.E.2d 731, 736 (N.Y. 1991). 
It is important that the Supreme Court, in 1991, in Allied-Signal Inc. v. Commissioner of Finance, 
extended its holding from its decision in 1944 in International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Taxation to justify taxation under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 737. International 
Harvester was decided before Complete Auto Transit formalized the Dormant Commerce Clause, so 
International Harvester was only decided under the Due Process Clause. See Int’l Harvester, 322 U.S. 
at 437 (defining the limitation on state taxation as the Due Process Clause). See generally Complete 
Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (defining the Dormant Commerce Clause as the important test for 
determining the constitutionality of state tax statutes). 
 18 Int’l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 442; J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444; Allied-Signal N.Y., 558 N.E.2d 
at 736–37. 
 19 See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 28–35and accompanying text. 
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fair decision.21 Section D of this Part highlights the relevant parts of state cor-
porate taxation for the unitary business rule.22 
A. Substantial Nexus and the Due Process Clause 
The substantial nexus requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test im-
plements the Due Process Clause requirement into the Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis, even though the Court in Complete Auto Transit did not 
phrase it in this manner.23 A substantial nexus exists when a taxpayer “avails 
itself” to the taxing state, thus benefitting from the “substantial privilege” of 
conducting its business within a particular state.24 The use of the word “avails” 
alludes to the Due Process Clause’s purposeful availment requirement for per-
sonal jurisdiction from the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Hanson v. 
Denckla.25 In 2009, in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, the Supreme Court 
used a “substantial privilege” standard, instead of the bare “privilege” standard 
it used in Hanson v. Denckla, signifying that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
standard is higher than the Due Process Clause requirement.26 Only substantial 
purposeful availment satisfies the substantial nexus requirement because receiv-
ing a substantial privilege from the taxing state requires more connection to it.27 
B. Sales Tax and the Physical Presence Requirement 
Beginning in the 1920s, sales tax grew in popularity in the United States 
and around the world.28 As of 2014, sales tax was codified in forty-five states 
and the District of Columbia.29 The application of sales tax requirements on a 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 50–72 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Michael Chisum, State Taxation of Interstate Corporate Income from Intangible Property: 
Due Process and Commerce Clause Limitations, 13 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (illustrating the 
constitutional restraints against state taxing power); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (stating that the sub-
stantial nexus requirement is similar to the Due Process Clause restriction). But see Complete Auto 
Transit, 430 U.S. at 279 (creating the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis without mentioning the 
Due Process Clause limitation). 
 24 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009). 
 25 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S 235, 253 (1958) (holding that a defendant must “purposefully 
avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state” in order to be sued in that 
state) (emphasis added). 
 26 Compare Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 11 (citing Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 437) (stating that the 
interaction with the state derives a substantial benefit), with Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (requiring that 
the interaction with the state derives a benefit). 
 27 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Robert Murray & Carl Shoup, The Sales Tax in the American States, 8 BULL. BUS. HIST. 
SOC’Y 74–75 (1934) (explaining that by 1934, sales tax statutes existed in fourteen states, Europe, 
South America, Australia, and Canada). 
 29 See Jared Walczak & Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates, Midyear 2018, TAX 
FOUND. (July 16, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-local-sales-tax-rates-midyear-2018/ [https://
II.-86 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
corporation imposes the duty of collecting the tax from the buyer and remitting 
the funds to the state.30 Sales tax litigation often centers on the duty of collec-
tion because collecting sales tax increases sales prices and creates an adminis-
trative burden for the vendor.31 
In 1967, in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, the Supreme 
Court held that National Bellas Hess (“Hess”), a mail order company, did not 
have the minimum connection with Illinois required to force it to collect and 
remit sales taxes.32 Hess’s only connection to Illinois was through the U.S. 
mail and common carriers.33 The Court held that a state cannot require sales 
tax collection if the connection between the retailer and the state exists solely 
through the U.S. mail and common carriers because of the administrative bur-
den it would place on mail-order companies.34 Twenty-five years later, in 1992 
in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court formalized the Bellas Hess 
rule by defining Complete Auto Transit’s substantial nexus factor as a require-
ment for physical presence in the taxing state before a state may require sales 
tax collection.35 
C. The South Dakota v. Wayfair Decision 
Quill has received much criticism36 and forced states to respond by adopt-
ing new interpretations of physical presence.37 In 2016, the South Dakota Sen-
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/4ZH3-URRV] (stating that sales tax are not enforced Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and Oregon). 
 30 See Guide to Sales and Use Taxes, MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.mass.gov/guides/
sales-and-use-tax [https://perma.cc/VA2M-3ML7] (stating that the buyer’s tax is added to the sales 
price, and then the vendor sends the tax to the state). 
 31 See, e.g., Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (deciding whether internet vendors are required to collect 
and pay sales taxes); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (determining whether a mail 
order company is required to collect sales taxes); Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967) (considering whether a mail order company must collect sales tax). 
 32 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. The Supreme Court decided Scripto, Inc. v. Carson in 1960 and, 
until the Court’s decision in 1967 in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, it was the fur-
thest reaching case, holding that ten independent salesmen in Florida constituted a minimum connec-
tion, and that their employment as independent contractors did not affect the constitutionality of the 
tax. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211 (1960). 
 33 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754. 
 34 See id. at 759–60 (detailing negative consequences of allowing Illinois to tax Hess). 
 35 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311, 314–15 (adding the Bellas Hess rule to the Complete Auto Transit 
test). The Court recognized the advantage this rule gives out-of-state vendors and asserted that Con-
gress is better suited to resolve this dispute. Id. at 315, 318. Because tax areas are viewed separately, 
cases in other areas of taxation have not adopted the Quill rule beyond sales and use taxes. See Phillip 
Zinn, The Requirements of “Substantial Nexus” and “Fairly Related” Under the Commerce Clause, 
ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 59, 59 (2007) (describing the lack of court guidance on how the physical pres-
ence rule applies to other areas of tax). 
 36 See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy J. concurring) (argu-
ing that Quill should be reconsidered in light of modern e-commerce trends and consumer sophistica-
tion). Justice Kennedy wrote separately in 2015 in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl to note that the 
2019] The Effect of the Internet Era and South Dakota v. Wayfair II.-87 
ate passed Senate Bill No. 106 (the “Act”), declaring an emergency from the 
state’s inability to collect sales tax from Internet sales.38 Challenging Quill, the 
Act required out-of-state sellers with annual in-state sales of over $100,000, or 
at least 200 individual transactions, to collect sales tax as if the seller had a 
physical presence in South Dakota.39 As provided under Sections 2 and 3 of 
the Act, South Dakota sought declaratory judgment to assess the validity of the 
Act and enjoined its terms until a reviewing court could determine its constitu-
tionality.40 The respondents, Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, 
Inc., were Internet vendors without a physical presence in South Dakota, and 
easily met the Act’s minimum sales revenue requirement.41 
                                                                                                                           
Court, in 1992 in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), should have taken the opportuni-
ty to reassess its decision in 1967 in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967), in light of the technological advancements. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy J. concurring). 
 37 See, e.g., Vendors Making Internet Sales, 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 64H.1.7(1)(b)2.a (2017) 
(asserting that “cookies” on in-state mobile devices and computers constituted a physical presence in 
the state). To counteract the physical presence rule from Quill, the Massachusetts Department of Rev-
enue, in 2017, adopted the Vendors Making Internet Sales regulation, concluding that data collected 
through “cookies” in computer and mobile applications within Massachusetts constitute a physical 
presence. Id. 
 38 S. 106 § 8, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). Passing South Dakota Senate Bill 106 
was undoubtedly provoked by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
2015 in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl. State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 761 (S.D. 2017) 
(stating that South Dakota “accepted Justice Kennedy’s invitation”). South Dakota estimated the 
“Sales Tax Loophole” prevented the collection of between $48 million and $58 million per year. Way-
fair, 138 S. Ct. at 2084. At the time the case was decided, sales tax accounted for sixty percent of 
South Dakota’s revenue. Id. at 2088. The Governmental Accountability Office estimated that the 
loophole deprived the fifty states of $13 billion in 2017. Greg Stohr, U.S. Supreme Court to Review 
Bid to Collect Internet Sales Tax (Jan 12, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-
12/bid-to-collect-internet-sales-tax-gets-u-s-high-court-review [https://perma.cc/2FKN-D9SQ]. The 
loss of sales tax revenue was depriving South Dakota of resources to fund the state government and 
other important organizations. S.D. S. 106 § 8. The states, however, are already collecting seventy-
five to eighty percent of the sales taxes they would be collecting if remote sellers were forced to col-
lect sales tax. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SALES TAXES: States Could Gain Revenue from 
Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are Likely to Experience Compliance Costs (2017), https://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-18-114 [https://perma.cc/B45Q-S6UM]. 
 39 S.D.S. 106 § 1. This statutory limitation protects against burdening smaller businesses who do 
not reach either the revenue or transaction requirements, while also protecting against unconstitution-
ally taxing a corporation that does not have substantial nexus to South Dakota. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2098–99 (defending against the argument that removing the Quill rule will subject small businesses 
and start-ups to an overwhelming challenge of nationwide sales tax collection). The burden of report-
ing is not as severe with modern technology than it was during the time of Bellas Hess because of 
advancements the Internet has provided towards tax collection and filing. See Joseph Bishop-
Henchmen, What Does the Wayfair Decision Really Mean for States, Businesses, and Consumers?, 
TAX FOUND (July 9, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/what-does-the-wayfair-decision-really-mean-for-
states-businesses-and-consumers/#5 [https://perma.cc/F6E6-J7NN] (stating that compliance software 
is available to coordinate multistate sales taxation). 
 40 See S.D.S. 106 §§ 2–3 (stating the state may bring a declaratory judgment action and such 
action would enjoin the statute until it survives a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion). 
 41 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089 (stating the respondents do not have any employees or real 
estate in South Dakota, and each had in-state sales beyond $200,000 in South Dakota). Systemax, Inc. 
II.-88 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
The State sued the defendants in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial 
Circuit in Hughes County, South Dakota, for noncompliance with the Act.42 
The defendants filed for removal to federal court, claiming the U.S. District 
Court for the District of South Dakota had original jurisdiction over the State’s 
claims.43 The South Dakota District Court did not find a federal question under 
the Grable test and well-pleaded complaint rule, and thus remanded the case.44 
Because Quill was the law and the Supreme Court must overturn its own cases, 
the district court directed the state circuit court to find that the Act was uncon-
stitutional.45 
The final determination of the Act’s constitutionality came in June 2018, 
in South Dakota v. Wayfair, when the Supreme Court upheld the Act, over-
turned Quill and Bellas Hess, and explicitly returned to the Polar Tankers sub-
stantial nexus definition.46 The Court held that Quill unnecessarily created the 
physical presence rule, resulting in improper distinctions between inter- and 
intrastate commerce.47 In particular, the Court noted that drastic improvements 
in technology since Quill allowed businesses to be impactful in states without 
a physical presence.48 The court found that the Act provided protection to 
                                                                                                                           
was also named as a defendant, but did not challenge South Dakota’s authority to impose sales tax 
collection. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1027 n.1 (D.S.D. 2017). 
 42 Complaint at 1, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (2016) (No. 32CIV16-000092), 2016 WL 
11534452. 
 43 Wayfair, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1029. 
 44 Id. at 1033–34. The State promoted the well-pleaded complaint rule from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1983 in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
The well-pleaded complaint rule states that to invoke federal question jurisdiction, the federal question 
must be in the plaintiff’s complaint, not in the defendant’s defense, regardless of whether the federal 
question defense was anticipated. Id. at 14. The defendants argued for the test illustrated in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in 2005 in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Man-
ufacturing. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). The Court in Grable held that a federal question must “necessarily 
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain 
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” 
Id. at 314. The District Court found that, under both tests, removal based on a federal question was 
improper. Wayfair, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. 
 45 Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d at 760 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
 46 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (citing Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 11). 
 47 Id. at 2092. Wayfair, Inc. recognized the advantage Quill gave it over in-state retailers and used 
this as a marketing tool by advertising on its website that a benefit their customers received was sales 
tax avoidance. Brief for Petitioner at 55, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 
17–494). 
 48 Id. at 138 S. Ct. at 2094. As of 2018, eighty-nine percent of Americans had Internet access, 
compared to two percent in 1992, when Quill was decided. Brief of Retail Litigation Center, Inc., et 
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 11 n.10, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). In the United States, e-Commerce sales are growing three times faster than 
traditional retail sales. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. CB18-173, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-
COMMERCE SALES: 3RD QUARTER 2018 (2018), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/
ec_current.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8JX-D6MC] (showing consistent fifteen percent growth for e-
commerce sales and five percent growth for retail sales). 
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small businesses with insufficient connections to the state, so vendors that met 
the statutory threshold had substantial nexus with South Dakota.49 
D. Corporate Income Tax 
For a state to tax an out-of-state corporation selling an interest in an in-
state subsidiary corporation, the transaction must have a connection with the 
taxing state.50 The unitary business rule states that such connection exists if the 
out-of-state corporation forms a “unitary business” with the in-state subsidiary, 
rather than the in-state corporation being a “discrete business enterprise.”51 If 
so, income derived from that unity of the businesses is taxable.52 Determining 
whether a unitary business exists focuses on the flow of value between the 
corporations.53 Functional integration, centralization of management, and 
economies of scale are the three “hallmark” factors that determine the exist-
ence of a unitary business.54 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098–99. 
 50 See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 778 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 306) (asserting that the Due 
Process Clause requirement necessitates a connection between the state and the taxpayer, property or 
transaction). 
 51 See id. at 772–73 (distinguishing a unitary business and a discrete business enterprise). A dis-
crete business enterprise exists when the income of the subsidiary in-state corporation is the result of 
an unrelated business activity. Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223–24 (1980). 
 52 Exxon, 447 U.S. at 223–24. When a state taxes the entire unitary business group as one entity it 
expands the state’s taxing jurisdiction. See Kimberley Reeder et al., The Unitary Group’s Identity 
Crisis: Is There Really an “I” in Unitary?, ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 83, 83 (2008) (noting that the dif-
ference in treatment of the corporate group as an aggregate taxpayer or as separate taxpayers can de-
termine the business group’s jurisdictional exposure). The unitary business rule encompasses the ben-
efits that pass within sections of a large corporation that standard accounting does not recognize based 
solely on in-state activity. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983) 
(detailing the shortcomings of formal geographical or transactional accounting). 
 53 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 178–79 (discussing the difficulty in determining the exact 
amount of value a corporation has at specific locations); see also, e.g., State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 
575, 606–07 (1875) (holding that the railroad system is more valuable than the sum of each state’s 
part assessed individually). A flow of value between two businesses shows the benefit an in-state 
corporation can receive from an out-of-state corporation. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 178 (1983) 
(examining when parent companies benefit from their subsidiaries). In 1983, in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Container Corp., the Court held that, when a corporation invests in another business where 
it can contribute value, the purpose of the investment was likely to make use of the parent corpora-
tion’s benefits. Id. This justifies the tax upon the out-of-state corporation because the interaction the 
out-of-state corporation has within the taxing state through the in-state corporation gives benefits to 
the out-of-state corporation. See J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444 (describing taxation as a payment for 
services rendered). 
 54 See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 789 (coining the term “hallmark”); Butler Bros. v. 
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (considering these factors as the main methods by which multi-
state corporations save costs, compared to smaller, individual corporations). Occasional oversight 
does not constitute a unitary business. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t of 
N.M., 458 U.S. 354, 369 (1982) (holding typical parental oversight is insufficient to create a unitary 
business). Functional integration is the comingling of business operations that offers the subsidiary 
operational support that they would not otherwise be able to benefit from. STATE OF MICH. DEP’T OF 
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In 1992, the Supreme Court, in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation (“Allied-Signal N.J.”), rejected New Jersey’s argument abandoning 
the unitary business rule, and allowing a state to apportion all income from 
out-of-state corporations who have subsidiaries within the state.55 The Court 
rejected New Jersey’s argument as unconstitutionally taxing beyond state 
lines.56 The Court reiterated support for the unitary business rule as one of po-
tentially multiple constitutional methods of apportionment.57 Moreover, the 
Court reasoned that the unitary business rule’s flexibility allowed it to update 
with developments in the business industry.58 
In 2008, in MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue, the 
Supreme Court analyzed whether a unitary business existed between 
MeadWestvaco, an Ohio corporation, and LexisNexis (“Lexis”), an Illinois 
corporation, before MeadWestvaco’s sale of Lexis.59 MeadWestvaco’s man-
agement of Lexis’s affairs involved oversight, approving annual business strat-
egies, and large transactions.60 MeadWestvaco claimed business expense de-
ductions of $680 million from Lexis between 1988 and 1993.61 The trial court 
found that MeadWestvaco and Lexis did not form a unitary business because 
they did not demonstrate the three hallmark factors.62 Nevertheless, the trial 
court held that Illinois could tax MeadWestvaco’s profit from the sale because 
                                                                                                                           
TREASURY, REVENUE ADMIN. BULL. 2010-2, at 3 (2010). Centralization of management is grouping the 
business’ strategic planning and operation under one leadership. Matt Barrett, Centralized and Decentral-
ized Management Explained, PERSONAL FINANCE LAB, https://content.personalfinancelab.com/finance-
knowledge/management/centralized-and-decentralized-management-explained/ [https://perma.cc/
JT4Y-QE37] (comparing centralized and decentralized management). This allows for consistency and 
strategic coordination between the subsidiary and parent corporation. Id. Economies of scale refers to 
the reduction of cost per item from bulk production. Economies of Scale, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan 29, 
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp. Implicitly, there is a grey area of 
interactivity between the hallmarks of a unitary business and an unrelated, discrete business activity. 
See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 789 (requiring functional integration, centralization of manage-
ment, and economies of scale for a unitary business); Exxon, 447 U.S. at 223–24 (defining a discrete 
business enterprise as an unrelated business activity). 
 55 Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 784. Because this argument was broad and arose for the first 
time at oral argument, the Court held a second oral argument centering on this question. See James A. 
Mirage, A Solidification of the Unitary Business Principle: Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 
46 TAX LAW 541, 544 (1993) (stating that the theory advanced by New Jersey would require only 
centralized management for apportionment). 
 56 Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 784. States have the freedom to create any apportionment for-
mula that values the in-state portion of multistate activity. Id. 
 57 See id. at 787 (mentioning three times that a unitary business is not constitutionally required to 
apportion income). 
 58 Id. at 786. 
 59 MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 19, 21 (2008). 
 60 See id. at 22 (describing MeadWestvaco’s role in Lexis’s various business activities). 
 61 Id. at 21. 
 62 Id. at 23. 
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Lexis served an “operational purpose” in MeadWestvaco’s business.63 The op-
erational function method was derived from specific language in Allied-Signal 
N.J. and Container Corp. that appeared to allow apportionment for capital 
transactions where the intangible asset served an operational function, rather 
than an investment function.64 The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial 
court’s opinion, stating that because MeadWestvaco owned Lexis, had exer-
cised control by approving transactions and cash expenditures, and used de-
ductions for business expenses relating to Lexis, the state had the right to tax 
the corporation.65 Because the Appellate Court of Illinois held that Lexis 
served an operational function, it did not address whether MeadWestvaco and 
Lexis formed a unitary business.66 Although the Supreme Court of Illinois de-
nied review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.67 
The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court of Illinois erred in con-
sidering Lexis’s operational function rather than analyzing the functional inte-
gration, centralization of management and economies of scale.68 The language 
found in Allied-Signal N.J. and Container Corp. was not intended to create an 
additional jurisdiction test.69 As a result, the case was remanded to the Appel-
late Court of Illinois for consideration of those factors.70 
The Court did not consider the state’s argument that MeadWestvaco’s sale 
of Lexis should be taxable based on Lexis’s connection with the state because 
the argument was not raised during the lower court proceedings.71 Additional-
ly, the Court did not examine this argument because Ohio and New York were 
already taxing this income and neither received notice about the potential de-
bate over the constitutionality of their tax codes.72 
                                                                                                                           
 63 MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 861 N.E.2d 1139–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Mead 
Corp. v Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 00CH7854, 2000 WL 35587638 at *12–13 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 
2003). 
 64 See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 787 (identifying an example of operational function as a 
short-term bank deposit, without a unitary business between the payor and the bank); Container Corp, 
463 U.S. at 180 n.19 (citing Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46, 50–53 (1955)). 
 65 See MeadWestvaco, 861 N.E.2d at 1140 (providing examples of the active role MeadWestvaco 
played in Lexis’s business). 
 66 Id. at 1139–41. 
 67 See MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 551 U.S. 1189 (2007) (granting certiorari); 
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 862 N.E.2d 235 (Ill. 2007) (denying the appeal from 
the Appellate Court). 
 68 MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 30. 
 69 Id. at 29. This approach is now limited to the taxpayer’s business assets. Fred M. Ackerson & 
Peter L. Faber, Supreme Court Curtails Scope of “Operational Function” Test in MeadWestvaco 
Corp. v Illinois Department of Revenue, MCDERMOTT NEWSLETTERS (Apr. 16, 2008), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f6d274fc-afbb-412d-a12e-6496759aee26 
[https://perma.cc/G8VX-FQGC]. 
 70 MeadWestvaco, 553 U.S. at 32. 
 71 See id. at 30–31 (declining to answer whether Lexis’s connections with the state justify taxa-
tion). 
 72 Id. at 31. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF WAYFAIR’S MAIN TAKEAWAYS 
In 2018, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Supreme Court returned to the 
substantial purposeful availment interpretation of substantial nexus because of 
the changes to the Internet since the Court’s 1992 decision in Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota.73 In doing so, the Court aligned the substantial nexus requirement 
with the Due Process Clause and personal jurisdiction.74 Personal jurisdiction is 
changing based on modern technology.75 Analysis of the recent changes in pur-
poseful availment can advise the proper considerations for substantial nexus.76 
Section A of this Part details purposeful availment.77 Section B of this Part em-
phasizes some recent changes in technology that could impact a corporation’s 
ability to acquire personal jurisdiction in another state.78 Section C of this Part 
discusses new case law regarding personal jurisdiction and the Internet.79 
A. Purposeful Availment 
Purposeful availment regarding personal jurisdiction occurs if a party 
takes direct action towards a state, thereby subjecting the party to the benefits 
and burdens of that state.80 The use of state resources justifies a court’s juris-
diction over the party.81 Courts have considered intentional actions directed to 
a state purposeful availment, therefore subjecting the actor to the court’s juris-
diction.82 Unintentional exposure or actions, however, do not grant courts per-
sonal jurisdiction over the actor.83 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (returning to the definition of 
substantial nexus in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)); supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
 74 See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
 77 See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 79 See infra notes 93–106 and accompanying text. 
 80 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S 235, 253 (1958) (stating that the defendant must act towards 
the state, rather than unilateral activity from the other party). Although in 1958, the Supreme Court in 
Hanson v. Denckla most likely could not have predicted the rapid changes in technology, in 1985, in 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court held that purposeful availment did not require physical 
presence because of the growth in mail and wire transactions. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
 81 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 82 See Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 479–80 (holding that a Michigan franchisee’s contract and interac-
tions with the Florida franchisor were sufficiently directed into Florida for specific jurisdiction). 
 83 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883, 887 (2011) (holding that equip-
ment sales through a distributor do not satisfy a minimum connection to New Jersey). 
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B. Modern Technology and the Internet Era 
As the Court emphasized in Wayfair, one concern pertaining to the sub-
stantial nexus requirement is advancements in modern Internet technology.84 
Physical presence is no longer required for vendors to actively pursue custom-
ers and there are certain benefits that online websites have over traditional re-
tailers.85 Regardless of the direct effect technology has on traditional retail, the 
indirect effect of increased Internet connectivity raises the importance of an 
online presence for vendors.86 
The Internet and information technology have improved various areas of 
the business industry, including research and strategy development, financial 
services, and corporate monitoring.87 Increasing the cost for a consumer to 
change to another company, improving product development, and replacing 
employees with technological labor are only some of the methods that utilize 
information technology to create a competitive advantage.88 Increased infor-
mational flow allows corporations to undertake more strategic development of 
their business portfolios, resulting in well-informed investments in new mar-
kets.89 Financial technology, known as “FinTech,” has simplified the process 
of transferring money and investing.90 Information technology also improves 
corporate oversight by improving risk management.91 These corporate func-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (repeatedly citing Direct Mktg. Assoc. v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 
1124, 1134–35 (2015) (Kennedy J. concurring)). 
 85 See id. (stating that websites have the ability to display more merchandise and connect with 
consumers than the traditional retail stores). According to a study conducted in 2015, thirty-four per-
cent of Americans preferred to shop online. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and 
E-Commerce, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 22 (2016). Another sign of change from technology is that 
twenty-four percent of Americans do not use cash. Id. at 17. 
 86 See Cadie Thompson, 21 Technology Tipping Points We Will Reach by 2030, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/21-technology-tipping-points-we-will-reach-by-
2030-2015-11 [https://perma.cc/P6CT-WWCK] (predicting the future growth of Internet usage around 
the world). 
 87 See Matthew Close et al., Leveraging Search Experts and Technology for Targeted Risk Over-
sight, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (July 13, 2018), https://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/leveraging-search-experts-and-technology-for-targeted-risk-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/
6AN6-7NF6] (describing different technologies and search engines that improve risk management); 
Bernard Marr, The Complete Beginners Guide to FinTech That Everyone Can Understand, FORBES 
(Feb. 10, 2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/02/10/a-complete-beginners-guide-
to-fintech-in-2017/#330777cd3340 [https://perma.cc/Y8WL-8C2R] (stating that domestic and interna-
tional money transfers are easier with modern technology); J. Yannis Bakos & Michael E. Treacy, 
Information Technology and Corporate Strategy: A Research Perspective, 10 MIS Q. 107, 108 (June 
1986) (stating that Information Technology improves internal, competitive, and business portfolio 
strategy). 
 88 Bakos & Treacy, supra note 87, at 111. 
 89 Id. at 115. 
 90 See Marr, supra note 87 (providing examples of the rapid growth of FinTech). 
 91 See Close, supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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tions are ways in which an out-of-state parent corporation can assist and pass 
value to an in-state subsidiary corporation.92 
C. The Impact of Modern Technology on Purposeful Availment 
By design, personal jurisdiction relates to a party’s use of benefits in spe-
cific geographical locations.93 The Internet and modern technology have chal-
lenged courts to determine new methods of analyzing personal jurisdiction in 
the digital age.94 For example, in 1997, in Zippo Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo 
Dot Com, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
established the “Zippo test” for analyzing Internet-based personal jurisdic-
tion.95 Zippo Dot Com (“Zippo”) was located in California with no physical 
presence in Pennsylvania.96 Zippo’s only connection to Pennsylvania was 
through advertising on its website.97 Considering that traditional personal ju-
risdiction exists through intentional actions toward a specific state, the Zippo 
test measures the interactivity between the website and the forum state on a 
sliding scale.98 The scale ranges from passive informational websites not estab-
lishing personal jurisdiction, to interactive vendor websites that seek interac-
tion with users of other states establishing personal jurisdiction.99 The court 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See MATTHIAS KRÜHLER ET AL., FIRST, DO NO HARM: HOW TO BE A GOOD CORPORATE 
PARENT 5–6 (2012) (presenting data on how parent corporations can assist subsidiaries through fi-
nancing advantages, strategy development, corporate resources and functions, operational engage-
ment, and business synergies). 
 93 See Alan Trammell & Derek Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the Interwebs, 100 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1129, 1157 (2015) (observing that personal jurisdiction is inherently territorial). Tradi-
tionally, personal jurisdiction has revolved around physical presence. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior 
Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619, 628 (1990) (stating that a court has jurisdiction over those sum-
moned in its state); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) (holding that a court may exert power 
only over persons and property within its limits). Because of its ease of accessibility and design, it is 
extremely difficult to determine location in the Internet context. Trammell, supra, at 1158. Judge Van 
Graaefieland equates the process of establishing law during the Internet era to boarding a moving bus. 
Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 94 See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2012) (establishing personal 
jurisdiction by use of a computer server in the forum state); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (developing a test (the “Zippo Test”) for determining the 
personal jurisdiction of websites based on the interactivity of the website). 
 95 Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 96 Id. at 1121. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. at 1124 (distinguishing between “passive” and “active” websites). 
 99 Id. A website that functions as advertisement is not interactive, and thus does not authorize 
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that website not for ordering and containing only vendor contact information was passive). When a 
website deliberately sells products, personal jurisdiction is warranted. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing personal jurisdiction over a corporation 
whose website forms contracts for the sale of software products). There are, however, cases that exist 
within the grey area of the Zippo test. See, e.g., Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 113 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 
(D.N.H. 2000) (examining whether jurisdiction in New Hampshire over out-of-state hotel based solely 
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held that Zippo purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania’s laws by pursuing 
business relations with individuals and Internet providers in Pennsylvania 
through its website.100 Since Zippo, several circuit courts have adopted the 
Zippo test as part or all of their personal jurisdiction analysis in the Internet 
context.101 In 2012, in MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals also examined personal jurisdiction relating to the Internet.102 The 
Second Circuit held that a state had jurisdiction over a person whose sole in-
teraction with the state was through accessing Internet files located on an in-
state computer server.103 The Second Circuit ruled that Deiter purposefully 
availed herself of Connecticut’s laws because she was aware that the infor-
mation was located on the Waterbury server and she accessed that server to 
retrieve confidential files.104 
These cases highlight that although the courts are applying old rules, they 
are consistently revisiting them and modernizing ways of establishing personal 
                                                                                                                           
on website was proper). The website for Marriott International provided a phone number and online 
process for hotel reservations. Id. at 214. The District Court of New Hampshire held that analysis of 
Internet personal jurisdiction depends on whether the website forms business transactions or other 
commercial activities. Id. at 223. Because evidence of website transactions was not presented, general 
personal jurisdiction could not be established. Id. Moreover, specific jurisdiction was not present 
because the plaintiffs did not use the website to book their reservation. Id. at 218. 
 100 Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1126. Zippo sold news services to about three thousand indi-
viduals, and formed a business relationship with seven Internet providers, in Pennsylvania. Id. 
 101 See Trammell, supra note 93, at 1150 (providing a table of which circuits have adopted the 
Zippo Test). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits use the Zippo Test, the First and D.C. Circuits have implic-
itly adopted the test, and the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits use it as one factor towards de-
termining personal jurisdiction of websites. Id. The Zippo Test was able to spread from a district court 
to several jurisdictions because judges find it easy to use, especially given the complexity of the Inter-
net. Id. at 1151 (stating that the Zippo Test provides judges a simple analysis for increasingly compli-
cated technology). 
 102 See MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 730 (establishing personal jurisdiction by use of a computer 
server in the forum state). The case involved MacDermid, Inc., a chemical company headquartered in 
Waterbury, Connecticut, and Jackie Deiter, a Canadian resident and an employee of a MacDermid subsid-
iary. Id. at 727. MacDermid Inc. stored confidential information on computer servers in Waterbury. Id. 
Employees were informed, as a condition of employment, that their confidential information was stored 
on the Waterbury server. Id. In violation of Connecticut trade secret law, Deiter accessed this server and 
forwarded confidential files to her personal email account. Id. 
 103 See id. at 727 (showing purposeful availment through the intentional use of the company’s 
server and awareness of the location of the server). On the other hand, in 2012, in Dairy Farmers of 
America, Inc. v. Bassett & Walker International, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that routine communica-
tion by phone calls and email with the Missouri-based corporation was not sufficient to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction with Missouri. 702 F.3d 472, 479 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-
Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011); Inst. Food Mktg. Assocs., 
Ltd. v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 456 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
 104 MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 730. 
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jurisdiction.105 Zippo and MacDermid, Inc., in their reexamination of the laws 
of personal jurisdiction, focus on one fundamental requirement: intent.106 
III. MODIFYING THE UNITARY BUSINESS RULE 
International business is growing through use of the Internet, online cash 
transferring, and other modern technologies.107 The unitary business rule, alt-
hough rooted in the 19th century, is supposedly flexible with changes in tech-
nology.108 Unfortunately, the rule is flawed and needs revisiting in light of the 
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, and the Court’s 
consideration of modern technology and substantial nexus as defined by per-
sonal jurisdiction.109 The unitary business rule has prevented states from re-
ceiving their fair percentage of interstate commerce.110 Section A of this Part 
argues that the unitary business rule is overly expansive.111 Section B of this 
Part promotes a new method of determining corporate tax jurisdiction for the 
sale of a subsidiary based on the fundamental principles of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.112 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
 106 See, e.g., MacDermid, 702 F.3d at 730 (allowing personal jurisdiction where the defendant 
was aware of the location of the server and used it); Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (holding 
that there is personal jurisdiction over businesses who knowingly use the Internet to enter into con-
tracts and transmit files to foreign jurisdictions); see also uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 
421, 427 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding advertisements, both physical and online, and an Anti-
Cybersquatting claim are sufficient to show the defendant targeted Illinois); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital 
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that uploading files to a website 
that is accessible in every state does not prove an intent to target every state). 
 107 See U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, New Globalization Report: Three Mega-Trends Ex-
pected to Impact Our Future (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/
intergovernmental-coordination/new-globalization-report.html [https://perma.cc/R89X-83CR] (assert-
ing an increased mobility of goods, services, labor, and funding in the modern, interconnected world). 
But see Lydia DePillis, Foreign Investment in the United States Plunged 32% in 2017, CNN MONEY 
(July 11, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/11/news/economy/foreign-direct-investment-
2017/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z28P-3EAS] (stating international investment has dropped in the 
past few years). One reason that was suggested is the political confusion surrounding Brexit and other 
surges in nationalism. Id. 
 108 See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation (“Allied-Signal N.J.”), 504 U.S. 768, 786 
(1992) (stating that the unitary business rule is flexible to changes in business). 
 109 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (reverting “substantial nex-
us” to a foundational definition in light of modern technology); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 335 (1982) (O’Connor J., dissenting) (focusing on ASARCO’s control over 
its subsidiaries as the determinative factor of a unitary business); infra notes 113–125 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing a Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause decision and changes in modern 
technology). 
 110 See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) (noting that interstate commerce 
must pay taxes for the governmental benefits it enjoys); W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 
U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (noting that the Commerce Clause does not protect interstate commerce from 
fairly apportioned taxation); infra notes 113–118 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 113–125 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 126–135 and accompanying text, 
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A. The Unitary Business Rule Does Not Properly  
Recognize the Flow of Value 
The Supreme Court’s application of the unitary business rule in 1982 in 
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission exemplifies its flaws.113 
ASARCO held 51.5% of Southern Peru Copper Corp., but did not exercise 
complete managerial control because of a contract formed with the other 
shareholders.114 Thus, the Court found insufficient connection to determine 
that a unitary business existed.115 Illinois argued that the unitary business rule 
included investments that contribute to the taxpayer’s business, but the Court 
held that this would be overly inclusive because every investment can contrib-
ute to the taxpayer’s business in some way.116 The dissent argued that Southern 
Peru provided benefits of profit stability and a steady supply of raw materials 
to ASARCO, and thus, ASARCO was responsible for compensating the state 
from which it received benefits.117 ASARCO shows that the current unitary 
business analysis is overly focused on managerial control, neglecting the im-
portance of benefits derived from other methods.118 
Modern technology exacerbates the flaws of the unitary business rule be-
cause ever-increasing Internet interconnectivity offers more ways to pass value 
to a subsidiary than functional integration, centralization of management, and 
economies of scale.119 According to the Boston Consulting Group, there are at 
least fifteen ways a parent corporation can add value to their subsidiary corpo-
ration under the following categories: (1) financing advancement; (2) strategic 
development; (3) corporate resources and functions; (4) operational engage-
ment; and (5) business synergy.120 Financing large purchases or growth for a 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 335 (O’Connor J., dissenting) (focusing on ASARCO’s control over 
its subsidiaries as the determinative factor of a unitary business). 
 114 Id. at 320–21 (majority opinion). ASARCO controlled Southern Peru with three other share-
holders. Id. at 322. The other three shareholders required ASARCO to sign an agreement that relin-
quished majority control. Id. The agreement assigned six out of thirteen directors to ASARCO and 
another six to the shareholder group. Id. The final member is jointly appointed, and eight votes are 
required to pass resolutions. Id. 
 115 Id. at 321. 
 116 Id. at 326 (stating that the rational extent of Idaho’s argument would be the inclusion of all 
investment as contributions towards the taxpayer’s business). 
 117 Id. at 332, 342 (O’Connor J., dissenting). 
 118 See ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 332–36, 340–43 (arguing that the Court is extending the Constitu-
tional restrictions on state taxation to effect policy). The Court unnecessarily constrains the state’s 
power to choose their tax structure and overlooks the benefits Southern Peru provides to ASARCO 
upon which the state can tax. Id. at 340. 
 119 See KRÜHLER, supra note 92, at 5–6 (illustrating methods a parent corporation can assist a 
subsidiary without functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale). 
 120 Id. at 5–6, 15. Financing advantages include external funding, internal funding, and tax opti-
mization. Id. at 6. Strategy development refers to strategic direction, active mergers and acquisitions, 
and protection from capital market pressure. Id. Corporate resources and functions are the benefits 
derived from corporate assets, central functions, and people advantages, such as employer branding. 
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subsidiary corporation is simpler now with advancements in FinTech.121 Stra-
tegic development and the implementation of business synergies are more ef-
fective with the use of information technology.122 Consequently, research and 
acquisition of subsidiary corporations with similar benefits to a parent corpora-
tion, like ASARCO and Southern Peru, is more valuable and profitable when 
using the Internet.123 Lastly, corporate oversight and management are more 
efficient at risk oversight through the Internet.124 With these methods of assist-
ing subsidiary corporations, out-of-state parent corporations can provide sig-
nificant value to in-state subsidiaries without facing that state’s taxation upon 
the disposition of that subsidiary.125 
B. New Apportionment Requirements Based on Old Principles 
The unitary business rule is only one constitutional method of determin-
ing tax jurisdiction.126 The Supreme Court should review the unitary business 
rule in the context of Wayfair and the Due Process Clause.127 Two factors—a 
flow of value between the multistate corporations and substantial benefits from 
the state to the out-of-state corporation—determine when a taxpayer has a sub-
stantial nexus with the state.128 A flow of value is the original requirement for 
tax jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate income.129 When there is a flow of 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Operational engagement involves budgeting and monitoring, corporate initiatives, and fostering 
cooperation. Id. at 6. Lastly, business synergies are sales synergies, managerial synergies, and opera-
tional synergies. Id. Each of these fifteen benefits are more accessible without functional integration 
and centralization of management because of modern technology. See supra note 88–91 and accom-
panying text (demonstrating advancements in business through information technology). 
 121 See Marr, supra note 87 (providing examples of different technological services that allow 
simpler money transfers for startups, small businesses, and international corporations). 
 122 See Bakos & Treacy, supra note 87, at 114 (diagramming methods that corporations can use to 
maximize their Information Technology to provide advantages over competitors). 
 123 See id. at 116 (discussing how a major competitive factor between rival corporations is bar-
gaining with suppliers). ASARCO does not have to negotiate for resources because of its relationship 
with Southern Peru. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 342 (O’Connor J. dissenting). 
 124 Close, supra note 87. 
 125 See infra notes 126–136 and accompanying text (arguing for taxation based on a flow of value 
and governmental services rendered). 
 126 See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 786–87 (repeating multiple times that the unitary business 
rule is not constitutionally required for taxing jurisdiction). 
 127 See supra notes 23–27, 38–48 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 178–79 (1983) (stating that 
the requirement for a unitary business is a flow of value. One potential way of satisfying this require-
ment is showing the three hallmark factors, however it can be demonstrated by other means); Int’l 
Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 442 (1944) (stating that the state may tax a 
proportionate amount of income derived from property to sales that receive the protections of the 
state); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (holding that the state may tax to re-
ceive compensation for services rendered). 
 129 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 178–79; see State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 606–07 (1875) 
(assessing the value of the railroad parts with respect to the entire railroad, rather than separately). 
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value from an out-of-state parent corporation to an in-state subsidiary, the par-
ent intended to use protections, resources, and benefits from the foreign state, 
providing jurisdiction for the state to tax the disposition of the corporate inter-
est or distributions to the out-of-state stockholders.130 The determination of 
whether a flow of value exists should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis be-
cause changes in technology will likely continue to add additional methods of 
exchanging value between corporations.131 
A corporation’s receipt of benefits from a state justifies taxation so the 
state can be compensated for providing them.132 Nevertheless, a substantial 
nexus based on the use of state resources cannot be too low a standard because 
a taxpayer’s acceptance of substantial benefits from the state is required.133 As 
shown by S. 106, states can use minimum sales and transaction thresholds in 
sales tax to ensure that insufficient connections from small businesses or large 
corporations with minimal in-state transactions are not burdened by the state’s 
tax.134 States can impose similar requirements on other factors, such as payroll, 
property, and corporate value, for the sale of subsidiaries.135 In applying these 
two factors, states can fairly tax out-of-state income.136 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Int’l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 421–22 (stating that a state may tax out-of-state income that 
relates to in-state commerce because it receives an abundance of state benefits); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
319 (holding that when a company conducts activities in a state, it receives benefits from the state); 
see also MacDermid, 702 U.S. at 730 (holding intent to avail oneself of a foreign jurisdiction was 
present when Deitner was aware of the location she was accessing and proceeded to interact with that 
location) Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (design-
ing a test that equates business in a foreign jurisdiction with an intent to avail oneself to the state). 
When a corporation and a subsidiary exchange value, both are acting with the knowledge of one an-
other’s location and the intent to use the resources of each other’s state. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (holding that forming a franchising contract with a foreign 
corporation that includes a choice-of-law provision avails oneself to that state). Of course, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in 1992 in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation proved that 
mere ownership is not sufficient for substantial nexus. See Allied-Signal N.J., 504 U.S. at 769 (reject-
ing New Jersey’s argument that the income should be apportioned based solely because of owner-
ship). 
 131 See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. This would close, but not completely elimi-
nate, the gap between the current unitary business threshold and discrete business enterprise. See su-
pra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 132 See Int’l Harvester, 322 U.S. at 442 (stating that the state may tax a proportionate amount of 
income from property or sales that receive the protections of the state); J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444 
(holding that the state may tax to receive compensation for services rendered). 
 133 See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009) (stating that the substantial 
nexus requirement necessitates that the taxpayer receive substantial benefits from the state). 
 134 See, e.g., S. 106 § 8, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016) (requiring either $100,000 in 
sales or 200 transactions); 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 64H.1.7(3) (2017) (requiring either $500,000 or 
100 transactions). 
 135 See, e.g., S.D.S. 106 § 1 (creating a threshold of 200 transactions and $200,000 sales); 830 
MASS. CODE REGS. 64H.1.7(3) (setting a threshold at 100 transactions or $500,000 sales); Drenkard, 
supra note 14 (arguing that property and payroll factors may accurately consider the benefits a state 
provides to a corporation). 
 136 See supra notes 126–135 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wayfair expanded state tax jurisdiction by overruling the physical pres-
ence rule in the Dormant Commerce Clause’s substantial nexus requirement. 
This opens the door to challenging other institutionalized forms of tax jurisdic-
tion. Value passes between corporations more seamlessly than ever. The uni-
tary business rule imposes arbitrary standards and does not properly recognize 
the benefits certain out-of-state corporations receive from other states. Modify-
ing the unitary business rule to consider the flow of value and the benefits giv-
en by the state would allow states to tax income earned from their services, and 
receive funds for those services. 
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